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I. INTRODUCTION
At the very inception of the United States the Founding Fathers
understood the importance of, and need for, a strong patent protection
system by providing in the Constitution that, "[t]he Congress shall have
power ... [t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing
for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries."' Patents and intellectual property
portfolios have become the lifeblood of many organizations thanks to
strong patent rights.2 Patent rights have helped to foster the innovation and
efficiency that has made the American economy strong. Lately, the rise of
certain patent-assertion entities, colloquially termed "patent trolls," has
renewed discussion on the proper balance and means of granting and
enforcing patent rights. These patent trolls have inspired spirited
conversations on many levels, from the halls of the White House4 to the
back room of the neighborhood store, about the state and effectiveness of
the current patent law. These conversations have weighty implications.
Recent studies have estimated patent trolls as accounting for at least
$30,000,000,000 in settlement and licensing fees annually.5 This number
"has increased fourfold" from 2003-2013 and continues to rise.6 The White
J.D. Candidate, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, Class of 2015.U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 8.
2 See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Why are Intellectual Property Rights
Important?, GLOBAL INTELL. PROP. CENTER (Dec. 28, 2014),
http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/why-are-intellectual-property-rights-important/.
3Id.
4 See generally Gene Sperling, Taking on Patent Trolls to Protect American
Innovation, WHrrE HOUSE BLOG (June 4, 2013, 1:55 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/06/04/taking-patent-trolls-protect-american-
innovation; see also Press Release, Off. of Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet -Executive
Actions: Answering the President's Call to Strengthen Our Patent System and
Foster Innovation (Feb. 20, 2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2014/02/20/fact-sheet-executive-actions-answering-president-s-call-
strengthen-our-p.
5 Joel B. Carter, Responding to a Patent Troll's Threats, ARK. LAW., Summer
2013, at 30.
6 Id. But see Pamela Maclean, Uptick in Patent Litigation Not Caused by 'Trolls ':
Study, REUTERS LEGAL, Nov. 19, 2013 (on file with the publisher).
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House estimates that over 100,000 companies were threatened by patent
trolls in 2012 alone.
This Note seeks to explain the patent troll problem and present a
comprehensive solution. The Note begins by outlining the definition of a
patent troll in Part II. This definition distinguishes other patent assertion
entities and explains why the patent troll problem is limited to the kinds
more precisely termed Trolling Patent Trolls (TPTs). The Note then
discusses the negative effects that TPTs have on society, particularly on
small businesses and entrepreneurs. Part III seeks to explain the relevant
changes at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) under
the new federal patent act (the America Invents Act) that improve the
quality of issued patents. These improvements affect the practice of TPTs
by reducing the availability of vague and ambiguous patents that TPTs
assert. In Part IV, this Note provides an overview of some recently
proposed legislation aimed at disrupting the TPTs' business model and
discusses their advantages and weaknesses. Finally, in Part V, this Note
proposes a balanced, comprehensive and multifaceted solution to the TPT
problem: a combination of legislative and judicial reforms with private
actions that will significantly reduce the TPTs' practice by providing
individuals and entities with the proper incentives, means and mechanisms
for fighting TPTs.
II. THE (TROLLING) PATENT TROLL PROBLEM
A. Definitions and Types of Patent Assertion Entities
Credit for coining the term "patent troll" is given to Peter Detkin,
former Assistant General Counsel for Intel, who came up with the term
after he was sued for defamation for using the term "patent extortionists" to
describe an opposing party.8 Detkin defines a patent toll as "somebody who
tries to make a lot of money off a patent that they are not practicing and
have no intention of practicing and in most cases never practiced." 9
Reminiscent of Justice Stewart's infamous definition of pornography, "I
know it when I see it,"' an exact definition for a TPT is a highly contested
matter and often involves the gut reaction of an experienced party. This is
particularly true because some entities blur the line between patent assertion
entity and TPT or practice a bit of both." The elusive nature of a concrete
7 Sperling, supra note 4.
8 Brenda Sandburg, You May Not Have a Choice. Trolling for Dollars, Patent
Enforcers Are Scaring Corporate America, and They Are Getting Rich - Very Rich
- Doing It, RECoRDER, July 30, 2001, at 1.
9 Id.
10 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart J., concurring).
1 "See, e.g., Joe Mullin, Uber-troll Intellectual Ventures Faces Motorola in First
Patent Trial, Three Patents, Two Low-profile Inventors, One Jury, ARS TECHNiCA
(Jan. 24, 2014, 11:15 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/01/uber-troll-
intellectual-ventures-faces-motorola-in-first-patent-trial/.
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TPT definition at least partially contributes to the continued difficulty in
crafting acceptable legislation to counter the effects of TPTs.' 2 Many of the
commonly used patent troll definitions focus on whether or not the entity
practices the patent.13 This results in the labeling of entities, such as
universities and research institutions, that do not generate the public costs a
TPT does and that many are unlikely to view as deserving of the label.'
4
Even the definition by the Intellectual Property Owners Association, while
more appropriately narrow, is still vague: "trolls are not themselves
inventors, but are always lawyers or investors who acquire paper patents
from insolvent individuals or companies at fire-sale prices."' 5 As this is an
area of developing definitions and renewed focus, these terms and
definitions continue to change.
Due to a developing and often overly broad TPT definition, many
entities are included in the current TPT definition that might not fit the
definition of a true TPT. There are three main types of trolls: inside trolls,
heat seeking trolls, and "regular" TPTs.16 "Inside trolls: are entities that
actually do produce a product, but often do not practice (i.e., do not produce
or manufacture the invention disclosed in their patents) on all, or even most,
of the patents in their portfolio. 17 These entities patent items they do not
specifically produce in order to prevent competition in their production
space.' 8 By excluding competitors, these entities may continue profitable
production of their practiced-on patented products. "Heat seeking trolls" are
non-producing entities that buy up patents from other institutions or have an
agreement with practicing entities to use their patents and assert them
against infringing entities via litigation.19 Heat seeking trolls often include
law firms or intellectual property groups licensed by universities who assert
their client's patent rights against infringers for a flat fee or sometimes even
on a commission basis. 20 Finally, "regular" TPTs are institutions that
typically buy up a number of old, inexpensive, vague and likely invalid
patents to assert against a large pool of weak targets via threatening letters
and license demands, but rarely assert their patents via litigation.2'
12 See Ashley Chuang, Note, Fixing the Failures of Software Patent Protection:
Deterring Patent Trolling by Appling Industry-specific Patentability Standards, 16
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 215, 218 (2006).
"aId at 219.14 Id.
15 Victoria E. Luxardo, Comment, Towards a Solution to the Problem of
Illegitimate Patent Enforcement Practices in the United States: An Equitable
Affirmative Defense of "Fair Use" in Patent, 20 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 791, 793-94
(2006) (citations omitted).
6 Carter, supra note 5.
171d
18Id.
191d.
20 See id.
21 id
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Regular TPTs are the institutions that individuals typically think of
as the "true" patent trolls. Before explaining why TPTs are really the true
"bad guys," a brief discussion of why other types of patent trolls do not
deserve a similar label is warranted. Inside trolls are often necessary for the
survival of an entity.22 Not every variant, improvement or related invention
to the practiced-on patent will likely be produced, even if that variant idea
is patented. This may be because entities need to clear space for their
invention to survive or because the idea was patented before the entity is
able to determine whether production is profitable. A party who comes up
with a new idea will likely patent every patentable embodiment of that idea
they can conceptualize, and sometimes that means taking out more than one
patent. Indeed, entities often require the protection of a provisional or non-
provisional patent before they are able to perform the necessary market
research, investor fundraising or commercialization research to determine
the profitability of a patented invention. Alternatively, an idea could be
initially promising, but later found unworkable due to regulatory, liability
or manufacturing cost concerns, to name a few possible reasons.
For a hypothetical example, imagine a doctor who comes up with a
cure for the common cold. The inventor might patent the drug in a
powdered form for pills, in a liquid form for swallowing and a different
liquid form for intravenous injection. The inventor may find that the drug is
most popular in the pill form because it tastes bad in a liquid and most
people do not care for shots. The inventor, having spent millions inventing
the cure, would likely still enforce his liquid and intravenous form patents
against other manufacturers. Otherwise, the inventor may not be able to
recoup all of his costs and make an adequate profit. Without these
incentives, the inventor may not have spent the time and energy to develop
a cure and the world would lose out on the benefit.
Heat seeking trolls can provide economically beneficial liquidity
and revaluation for patents available on the market by buying out patent
rights.23 Like other commodities, the more patents are bought, sold or
licensed, the more accurate the market price. In fact, many universities and
research institutions use heat seeking patent trolls essentially as outsourced
patent enforcers, hiring them to enforce their patent rights against
infringers.24  Additionally, as some heat seeking trolls work on
commission, they may provide the only financially viable means for an
entity, particularly a small business or entrepreneur who has fewer
resources, to enforce their patent rights.
22 See id.
23 See id.
24 Peter Lee, Patents and the University, 63 DuKE L.J. 1, 43-44 (2013).
25 Id.
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Regular TPTs have few, if any, of these redeeming qualities.2 6 At
least one commentator analogized TPTs to blackmail, a market that
required judicial and legislative action to shut down.27 This commentator
noted that the simple presence of willing buyers and sellers does not equate
with social welfare. 28 TPTs do not produce anything or come up with any
new ideas because they simply purchase already-available patents with no
intent to produce.29 Further, they do not provide significant liquidity or
revaluing because they choose their buying, selling and licensing fees based
on the transactional costs of litigation, not on the value of the patent.3 °
Additionally, many of the asserted patents are ones that, if litigated, would
likely be found invalid. These patents are asserted against a multitude of
individuals and entities, many of whom would be found not to be infringing
the asserted patents if they chose to challenge the infringement claim.3'
This has a net effect of TPTs making large sums of money from innocent
parties that could otherwise be spent on things like growth, research and
development, and job creation. TPTs have made a viable and often very
lucrative business from this practice.32
B. An Overview of the TPT Problem-Why TPTs Exist
TPTs are able to exploit their business niche for many reasons.
First, many potentially invalid patents are approved by the USPTO every
year.33 Even if valid, these patents often have an overly broad scope that
allows the holder to sue a larger number of individuals or entities than is
26 See generally T.J. Chiang, What is a Troll Patent and Why Are They Bad?,
PATENTLY-O (Mar. 6, 2009), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/03/what-is-a-
troll-patent-and-why-are-they-bad.html; Brian J. Love & James C. Yoon, Article:
Expanding Patent Law's Customer Suit Exception, 93 B.U. L. REv. 1605, 1609-10
(2013).
One thing that is not seriously debated, however, is the harm
caused by patent holders that specialize in nuisance-value patent
litigation. No one champions these "bottom feeders" of the NPE
ecosystem: a class of patentees that overwhelmingly acquire old,
extremely weak patents and assert them against the numerous,
unsophisticated purchasers (rather than manufacturers) of
allegedly infringing products in suits that typically settle for less
than defendants' anticipated litigation costs.
Id.
27 Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent
Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583 (2009).28 See generally id.
29 Id. at 1599.
30 See id. at 1600.
3 1See id. at 1610.
32 See discussion infra Part II.B.
33 Benjamin J. Bradford & Sandra J. Durkin, A Proposal for Mandatory Patent
Reexaminations, 52 IDEA 135, 136 (2012) ("The patents licensed and enforced by
NPEs or patent trolls are often considered 'bad patents' because of the likelihood
that they are invalid and were only issued because the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office .. ").
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actually warranted by the prior art, and contains vague or ambiguous
language that fails to put the USPTO examiners, potential defendants,34
judges and juries on notice as to what exactly the patent covers.35 Finally,
challenging TPTs represents a classic "free rider" problem-one person
may expend the time and resources required to invalidate a patent or have a
technology declared not infringing, but the entire class of individuals
affected by the asserted patent gets to free ride on the judgment and no
longer needs to be concerned about the TPTs' threats.
While the asserted patents may be found invalid if litigated, patent
infringement claims are infrequently made because of the significant
transactional costs of defending an infringement claim or obtaining an
invalidity judgment. The hefty legal expenses involved in litigating a patent
are approximately $1,000,000 just to get to discovery and over $2,000,000
to get to a decision on the merits.36 TPTs are aware of these significant
transactional costs and agree to settle their claims with the potential
defendant via an exclusive license for a value below the litigation cost
threshold, but large enough to be significant ($20,000 to $100,000 is not
unusual).37 As these license fees are extracted via patents that are likely
invalid or not infringing, many equate the TPT practice to a modem day
shake down. Patent attorneys are also aware of these problems and often
feel forced to encourage their clients to simply pay the licensing fee.38
A typical TPT business model takes advantage of potential
litigation costs to dissuade patent owners from defending against the claim.
This pushes potential defendants into a position where they are incentivized
to simply pay the licensing fee without much contest. Therefore, TPTs
rarely actually litigate patents. As such, if potential defendants can identify
that they are dealing with a known TPT, they may elect to take a calculated
risk and avoid the licensing fee by fighting the case until the TPT drops it,
or by simply failing to respond to the TPTs' threats all together.39 Further,
the allegedly infringing technologies threatened by the TPT are typically
not central to that party's business (e.g., Wi-Fi patents asserted against a
coffee shops that offers Wi-Fi for its guests or networked printer-scanner-
copier patents asserted against a real estate office), so potential defendants
are unlikely to be well versed in intellectual property matters (i.e., they are
easily frightened or intimidated into a lawsuit) and are unlikely to be highly
invested in the outcome. Thus, these businesses are not highly incentivized
34 For the purposes of this Note, "potential defendants" refers to the parties
threatened by trolling patent trolls who theoretically could be defendants in an
infringement action.35 Bradford & Durkin, supra note 33, at 137.36 See Caroline Coker Coursey, Battling the Patent Troll: Tips for Defending
Patent Infringement Claims by Non-manufacturing Patentees, 33 AM. J. TRIAL
ADvoc. 237, 241 (2009).
37 See generally id.
38id
39 id.
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to invest their resources into a non-infringing or invalidity declaration.
Unfortunately, this is not the only issue.
Another important part of this problem is that TPTs typically go
after a large number of individual defendants who must each litigate the
matter separately, as opposed to going after a manufacturer or product
provider who has the incentive to litigate on behalf of its current and future
customers.4 In fact, it is common practice for the threatening letters sent by
TPTs to explicitly state that they are not going to sue manufacturers or
product providers in the hopes of keeping out these parties who might have
the incentives and resources to fight the TPT.41 Further, these potential
defendants are generally spread geographically and do not know each
other.42 Even if they had the desire to somehow pool their resources, it is
unclear if they are even able to identify each other or legally permitted to
pool their resources.43 In any matter, the logistics would likely prevent such
collaborative action.44 It is also difficult for these potential defendants to
know if they are dealing with a TPT or a different type of patent assertion
institution because TPTs work to obfuscate their true identity, typically by
operating through a complex series of shell companies.45 These shell
companies serve not only to disguise the real party in interest in the lawsuit,
but also to shield and limit the TPT's assets from liability.
46
The result is that these patents are rarely challenged, even if they
are invalid or the potential defendant is not infringing. A few companies
have taken a stand against these infringement threats. Newegg is a
prominent example. It has chosen to fight TPTs based on ethical reasons
and the idea that fighting will result in the long-term benefit of not being
threatened by other TPTs who will realize that they are in for a battle, one
that could ruin their business model with an invalidity or non-infringement
47declaratory judgment. Newegg and other similar companies have taken apublic stand that they will fight all entities they see as TPTs, and they have
40 See J.P. Mello, Technology Licensing and Patent Trolls, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH.
L. 388, 394 (2006).
41id.
42 See id
43 See id. at 397.
44id
45 See generally Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN.
TECH. L. REv. 1 (2012).
46 See generally id.
47 See generally Julie Knudson, When the Patent Trolls Come Knocking NewEgg
calls in Lee Cheng, PROFILE (Oct.-Dec. 2013),
http://profilemagazine.com/2013/newegg/; Joe Mullin, Newegg Hurtles Toward
Texas Showdown with Famed "Patent Troll", ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 18, 2013, 9:30
AM) [hereinafter Texas Showdown ], http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2013/1 1/newegg-hurtles-toward-texas-showdown-with-famed-patent-troll/;
Joe Mullin, "Shopping Cart" Patent Troll Tries to Save Itself, Gets Pounded by
Newegg, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 6, 2013, 3:45 PM) [hereinafter "Shopping Cart"
Patent Troll ], http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/09/shopping-cart-patent-
troll-tries-to-save-itself-gets-pounded-by-newegg/.
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done so against some of the nation's largest and best-funded ones.48 These
include suits against TPTs asserting patents on online shopping carts49 and
public encryption-which are some of the most widely asserted patents in
history.50 Newegg cannot fight all the TPT battles, however. The high costs
of time, money and energy, tricky logistics, uncertainty of litigation and the
free rider effect often prove too much for companies and they, rationally,
choose simply to settle for a licensing fee.51 As a result, many lawmakers
have begun an earnest search for a solution that eases the burden of
litigating against TPTs.
C. TPTs Have a Significant Negative Effect on Small Businesses and
Entrepreneurs
TPTs often target small and entrepreneurial businesses due to their
relatively smaller assets, lack of experience and fear of legal action.52
Numerous news articles detail the exploitation by TPTs, particularly those
who prey on small and entrepreneurial businesses. One such example is a
TPT that bought several patents related to wireless technology and
proceeded to send mass threatening letters targeting franchised hotels,
coffee shops, stores and restaurants.53 The TPT sent letters threatening
litigation, but providing the alleged offenders with the option of dropping
charges in exchange for a $2,300 to $5,000 licensing fee.54 Presumably, the
TPTs target these small business owners because the owners have sufficient
assets to pay the licensing fee, but lack the experience and resources to fight
the infringement claim.55 More importantly, these small businesses lack the
incentives and desire to risk losing an invalidity or non-infringement
declaratory judgment proceeding, or even worse, to be found to actually be
infringing and forced to pay potentially hefty damages.56
In a similar story, a TPT law firm bought a portfolio of patents
related to networked printer-scanner-copier combination devices.57 These
48 See Knudson, supra note 47.
49 See, e.g., "Shopping Cart" Patent Troll, supra note 47.
50 Texas Showdown, supra note 4751 Knudson, supra note 47; see also Texas Showdown, supra note 47 (The Jones
patent litigation involving five years of litigation, "hundreds" of lawsuits, "tens of
millions" of dollars in payments, a still unclear result.).
52 See Chuang, supra note 12, at 231-232.
53 Mike Masnick, Patent Troll Says Anyone Using WiFi Infringes; Won't Sue
Individuals 'at this Stage', TECHDIRT (Oct. 3, 2011, 11:28 AM),
http://www.techdirt.com/blog/wireless/articles/20111001/00365416161/patent-
troll-says-anyone-using-wifi-infringes-wont-sue-individuals-this-stage.shtml.54 Id.
55 Id.
56 See id.
57 Steve Salzberg, Did You Scan and Email That Document? You Might Owe $1000
to a Patent Troll, FORBES (Aug. 5, 2013, 8:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevensalzberg/2013/08/05/did-you-scan-and-email-
that-document-you-might-owe- 1000-to-a-patent-troll!.
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devices, which are used in most homes and businesses, allow a user to scan
a document and send it to a networked computer.58 The TPT law firm
proceeded to send out mass threatening letters offering a $1,000 licensing
fee to avoid litigation, particularly to small businesses.59 Numerous other
stories repeat essentially the same theme across a variety of small
businesses and technologies.60
The issue of TPTs is one that has plagued small businesses and
entrepreneurs for some time now, increasingly so in recent years.6 1 As the
TPT problem continues to rise, the conversation around TPTs has grown
increasingly urgent as businesspersons continue to demand solutions to the
growing problem. In the subsequent parts, this Note seeks to explain the
relevant changes under the new America Invents Act patent legislation that
affect the practice of TPTs, overview some of the proposed TPT legislation
and propose a multi-faceted solution to the TPT problem.
III. THE BATTLE FOR BETTER PATENTS AT THE USPTO AND
IMPROVEMENTS MADE BY THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT
As previously discussed, TPTs operate by accumulating overly
broad, vague, confusing and likely invalid patents that cover large
technological areas and often fail to put the examiner and potential
defendant on sufficient notice as to what the patent covers.62 Many point to
the USPTO as a major source of this problem and blame the lack of USPTO
resources for the issuance of poor-quality patents.63 The lack of resources at
the USPTO is a legitimate concern, but it is one that is outside the scope of
58 Id,
59 Id.60 See Love & Yoon, supra note 26, at 610-11.
Recent years have seen a spike in high-profile patent assertion of
this sort. In the last two years, NPE Innovatio[n] has asserted its
patent rights - rights the company alleges cover any use of a Wi-
Fi network - against hundreds of small businesses like coffee
shops and hotels that offer wireless network access to patrons...
mobile applications that enable users to make purchases on
mobile devices ... NPE Project Paperless has threatened to sue
an untold number of small offices for infringing patents that
allegedly cover copiers equipped to email scanned files . . .
Personal Audio has similarly threatened end users of podcasting
software. Entities like PJC Logistics and ArrivalStar have sued
over 600 trucking companies, private auto fleet owners, and
public bus and rail authorities that use GPS devices to track their
vehicles.
Id.; see also Victoria Finkle, Why Patent Reform Matters to Banks, AMERICAN
BANKER (Dec. 6, 2013, 2:06 PM),
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_234/why-patent-reform-matters-to-
banks-1064106-1.html (explaining the impact of patent trolls on banks).
61 Bradford & Durkin, supra note 33, at 138-41; Sperling, supra note 4.
62 Sperling, supra note 4.
63 Bradford & Durkin, supra note 33, at 138-41.
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this Note. What is likely the largest and most significant piece of patent
legislation in recent history was signed into law on September 16, 2011, the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (the America Invents Act or AIA). 64 The
AIA made many notable changes to U.S. patent law, fundamentally
changing it from a "first-to-invent" to a "first-to-file" system.61 Other
important changes allow for greater access to the USPTO, and particularly
to its post-issuance review and challenge processes, for smaller entities and
individuals who are interested parties.66 Those changes will likely prove to
have a lasting effect on the quality of the patents issued from the USPTO.
These positive changes will have a long-term deterrent effect on TPTs by
reducing the number of vague, confusing, and likely invalid patents issued.
As the vague and confusing patents available now continue to expire, they
will no longer be available in the market place, and therefore will not be
available for TPTs to assert. This has the added benefit of relatively
increasing the number of valid and clear patents in the market, which
improves the faith in the USPTO, U.S. patent law and the judicial system.
Some of these changes include the implementation of derivative
proceedings, revised post-grant review, the addition of the inter partes
review proceedings and the alteration of the fee schedule to include reduced
fees for small and micro entities. Each of these items will be discussed in
turn.
A. Derivative Proceedings-the New System for the AIA 's First-to-
file System
Derivative proceedings allow an alleged inventor to contest the
issuance of a patent if he believes that he is in fact the true inventor, or
believes that the challenged invention is a mere derivative of their existing
invention.67 This proceeding replaces the interferences proceeding under the
old patent system (i.e., pre-AIA), where an alleged inventor could assert
that he invented the claimed invention first. As the AIA has moved the
United States into a first-to-file system, the party who invents first no
longer matters. However, true and valid inventorship remains an important
requirement for a valid patent to be issued. This new derivative proceeding
continues to help ensure that the patents issued by the USPTO are valid by
giving other interested parties the opportunity to assert their inventorship of
the claimed invention. Further, the "mere derivative" aspect of the
derivative proceeding allows an inventor to challenge a patent that is the
64 See generally Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong., (1 st
Sess. 2011) (enacted).
65 See generally id.
66 See generally id.
61 See 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) (Supp. V 2011) ("In a derivation proceeding instituted
under subsection (a), the Patent Trial and Appeal Board shall determine whether an
inventor named in the earlier application derived the claimed invention from an
inventor named in the petitioner's application and, without authorization, the earlier
application claiming such invention was filed.").
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same or substantially the same (i.e., patentably indistinct) as the claimed
68invention. 8 This new proceeding is cheaper than the old interference
proceeding and thus more accessible to small businesses and entrepreneurs
who typically have fewer assets than large entity filers, such as
corporations.69
B. Post-grant Review Remains Helpful, but Largely Unchanged
Post-grant review is a process whereby anyone can challenge the
validity of a patent that has been recently issued.7° This process allows
interested parties to help ensure that accurate and valid patents are issued by
the USPTO by permitting these parties, who naturally have an incentive to
challenge a patent's validity, to present their arguments before the USPTO.
Post-grant review has not seen many changes under the AIA, but its
continued presence is a vital part of ensuring that only high-quality patents
are issued from the USPTO. The post-grant review procedure allows a
person to challenge the validity of the patent on any potentially invalidating
grounds.7' The person can challenge the validity of the patent by submitting
any prior art that bears on the patentability of any claim or statement by the
inventor related to the scope of the invention.72 The challenge will be
allowed if it is more likely than not that a claim will be invalid or the
challenge will resolve an important, novel or unsettled legal question.73 The
burden of proof for invalidation under these proceedings is on the
challenger, who must prove invalidity by a preponderance of the
evidence. 74 While the cost of post-grant review is not trivial (starting at
$35,800 in filing fees and rising sharply based on the number of challenged
claims, not including attorney's fees), it is still typically much more cost-
effective than traditional litigation.75
While post-grant review is a helpful mechanism, it does have its
shortcomings. First, the challenge must be filed within nine months of the
68 See Gene Quinn, First Inventor to File: UPSTO Derivative Proceedings Go
Final, IP WATCHDOG (Sept. 10, 2012, 11:26 AM),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/09/1 0/first-inventor-to-file-uspto-derivation-
proceedings-go-final/id=27986/.
9 Richard G. Braun, America Invents Act: First-to-File and a Race to the Patent
OfTce, 8 OHIO ST. ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 47, 49 (2013).
Eugene T. Perez, Post-Grant Review, POST GRANT PROCEEDINGS,
http://www.postgrantproceedings.com/patent-modification/post-grant-review.html
blast visited Apr. 6, 2014).
1 Jeffrey C. Parry, Preemptive Strike.: New Third Party Patent Review Procedures
Via the America Invents Act, 55 ADvoC. 18, 19 (2012).
72 Id.
73 Chad M. Rink, Post-Grant Review and Inter Partes Review, POST GRANT
PROCEEDINGS, http://www.postgrantproceedings.com/topics/article-
CMRPGRIPR.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
74 Id.
75 Parry, supra note 71.
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publication of the patent or patent application in question.76 Potential
defendants of TPTs are seldom targeted so early in the life of a patent.77
Most TPTs do not even acquire a patent until after the patent has been
issued for several years.78 Secondly, post-grant review challenges trigger an
estoppel effect. 79 This means that a party will be bound by the judgment
made and estopped from arguing the merits that were raised, or reasonably
could have been raised, on appeal to the district or circuit court.80 This
broad estoppel effect often makes litigators hesitant to invoke this
proceeding since they cannot relitigate the issue later should their challenge
fail. Relatedly, proceedings at the USPTO are generally less formal and
regulated than at the district or circuit court levels, as required to meet their
goals of being faster and cheaper than traditional litigation. Some
practitioners fear that this less formal setting might not give proper weight
to their arguments and result in less thorough scrutiny of the challenged
patent. This informality coupled with the estoppel effect deters some
practitioners from recommending post-grant review to their clients.
C. Inter Partes Review-the Crown Jewel of New Review Procedures
The inter partes review process is a new procedure implemented by
the AIA that replaces and greatly improves upon the inter partes
reexamination procedure.8' Like post-grant review and inter partes
reexamination, this proceeding allows for interested parties to help ensure
that accurate and valid patents are issued by the USPTO. This has the long-
run effect of discouraging TPTs by limiting the availability of potentially
invalid or murky patents. This new procedure fills the gap after post-grant
review, allowing challenges to the validity of a patent after nine months
from issuance.
82
Like post-grant review and inter partes reexamination, inter partes
review allows a person to challenge the validity of the patent on any
potentially invalidating grounds.83 The person can challenge the validity
under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 (anticipation) or 103 (obviousness).84 The
76 id.
77 See, e.g., Jeff John Roberts, Troll Sues New York Times with 1998 Patent from
Holocaust Group, GIGAOM (Oct. 22, 2013, 12:37 PM),
http://gigaom.com/2013/10/22/troll-sues-new-york-times-with-1998-patent-firom-
holocaust-group/.
78 id.
79 Rink, supra note 73.
80 id.
81 Id. See generally IPX vs. IPR, A Cheat Sheet, STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN &
Fox, PLLC (2012),
http://www.skgf.com/uploads/29/doc/InterPartesReexamination-vs._InterPartes
Review.pdf.
2 Inter Partes Review, FISH & RICHARDSON POST-GRANT REVIEW,
http://fishpostgrant.com/inter-partes-review (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
83 Id.
84 Rink, supra note 73.
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challenge will be allowed if there is a reasonable likelihood that petitioner
will prevail.8 ' The burden of proof for invalidation under these proceedings
is on the challenger who must prove invalidity by a preponderance of the
evidence.86 While the cost of inter partes review is not trivial (starting at
$27,200 in filing fees and rising sharply based on the number of challenged
claims, not including attorney's fees), it is still typically much more cost
effective than traditional litigation.87
The interpartes review procedure corrects many of the deficiencies
of the inter partes reexamination procedures. While the inter partes review
process is more expensive, it is more thorough, expedited and settlement
friendly. It is more settlement friendly because settlements do not trigger an
estoppel effect.88 The review is expedited; it is down to eighteen months
from the thirty-six months. 89 For thoroughness, inter partes review includes
a discovery process, an oral argument and the review is performed by a
more experienced, higher-authority board than its predecessor. 90 These
improvements result in better opinions and provide the review more weight
in subsequent legal proceedings.
Inter partes review still has similar estoppel effects and informality
concerns as compared to post-grant review. However, the first full decision
on the merits of an inter partes review petition has been handed down by
the USPTO in Garmin International, Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Technologies,
LLC.91 The fact that a major company like Garmin decided to utilize inter
partes review suggests that the advantages of inter partes review may
outweigh the risks.92 In this case, Garmin petitioned against Cuozzo Speed
Technology over a speed limit indicator used in conjunction with their GPS
units that provides a signal to the driver when the vehicle is exceeding the
speed limit.93 The court sided with Garmin and invalidated Cuozzo's
patent.94
Perhaps most importantly, the decision to cancel the claims was
based on an obviousness combination of four patents, which is more than
the two or sometimes three patents that district courts typically entertain.95
This suggests that petitioners may be able to win on more factually complex
situations at the administrative level with proceedings involving inter
partes review, where the arguments are made before administrative judges
85 id.
86 id.
87 PX vs. IPR, A Cheat Sheet, supra note 81.
88 id.
89 id.
90 Id.
91 Dennis Crouch, A First IPR Decision on the Merits, PATENTLY-O (Nov. 14,
2013), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/1 1/first-ipr-decision.html.92 See id.
93 Id.94 Id.
95 Id.
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who all have technical backgrounds, than in the district or circuit courts.
96
This is significant because the factual findings in administrative hearings
often benefit from a "substantial evidence" standard in the district or federal
circuit courts, or even a "clear and convincing" standard in some
circumstances. 9 Therefore, if a petitioner can be successful at the less
costly and less time consuming administrative level via inter partes review,
that petitioner will likely be entitled to some level of deference at the
district court or circuit court levels. Thus, inter partes review may be an
advantageous strategic choice for parties interested in declaring a third
party's patent invalid.
D. The Addition of Micro Entities to the Fee Schedule is a Helpful
Step
The AIA has also implemented a new, enhanced equity-based fee
schedule. This new fee schedule separates institutions into large, small and
micro entities; the micro entity is a new addition under the AlA.98 A "large"
entity is defined as any entity that is not a "small" or "micro" entity.99 A
small entity is essentially one that has not assigned its rights to a large
entity, has 500 or fewer employees or is a non-profit organization.'00 A
micro entity is essentially an entity that has filed less than four patents, had
an income in the previous year of less than three times the median U.S.
income and that has not assigned its patent to someone with an income in
the previous year of more than three times the median U.S. income. 10'
Generally, a small entity's fees are half of a large entity's fees, and a micro
entity's fees are half of a small entity's fees (i.e., a quarter of a large
entity's fees). 10 2 These reductions are equally applicable for the
aforementioned review methods, thus lowering the barrier to entry for small
businesses and entrepreneurs, those often most affected by TPTs, to
challenge a patent's validity by initiating any of the above reviews.
E. The Repeal of Joinder in Infringement Suits
As part of the AIA, an anti-joinder provision was enacted. Under
the previous patent laws, a plaintiff could join a group of defendants solely
96 id.
97 Robert M. Asher, Inter Partes Review: The New Markman Hearing?, AM. B.
ASS'N (Feb. 20, 2012),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/intellectua/articles/winter20 12-
inter-partes-review-markman-hearing.html.
98 Current Fee Schedule, USPTO,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee03l9l3.htm (last revised Mar. 13,
2014).
99 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong., (lst Sess. 2011)
enacted).
'0 13 C.F.R. § 121.802 (2014).
101 Id.
102 See Current Fee Schedule, supra note 98.
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because they were all accused of infringing the same patent. 10 3 Under the
AIA, plaintiffs can no longer join alleged defendants solely under this
theory.1 4 The idea behind this provision is to increase the burden on TPTs
to initiate litigation, making litigation more costly and time consuming for
the TPT and thus discouraging TPT litigation. 0 5 This provision, while
helpful, does not do enough to discourage trolls. Though it does make it
more burdensome for TPTs to pursue litigation, many TPTs base their
business model on either never, or very rarely, pursuing litigation. Rather,
these TPTs generally gather their licensing fees simply by sending
threatening letters. Therefore, the parties that this provision is most likely to
impact are the other types of patent assertion entities that actually provide a
beneficial market action.
The AIA takes many steps towards improving the quality of patents
that are issued by the USPTO, particularly by providing improved
processes that involve interested third parties, allowing these parties to
argue and challenge the merits of a patent at all stages of a patent's life via
revising derivation proceedings and post-grant review and implementing
inter partes review and micro entity fees. Again, as these processes
continue to improve issued patents, a higher percentage of issued patents
will be valid and clear. Over time, the overly broad, vague, confusing and
likely invalid patents will expire and be replaced by these clear and valid
patents. Thus, the aggregate effect of improving patent quality has the long-
term effect of reducing the number of murky patents available to TPTs.
These steps, which provide lower-cost alternatives to traditional litigation,
have a significant impact on small businesses and entrepreneurs who are
frequently the target of a TPT's threats.
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATION IS HELPFUL, BUT DOES NOT
ADEQUATELY SOLVE THE TPT PROBLEM
Due to the increased conversation and political pressure on the
issue of TPTs, a remarkably high amount of legislation has been proposed
recently. 10 6 The problem of TPTs is complex and involves balancing many
factors and potentially impacts many industries. Because not all of the
proposed legislation can be discussed in this Note, efforts were taken to
select the legislation that currently appears to be the most promising and is
103 George D. Medlock Jr. & David Frist, Joinder: Over a Year After the America
Invents Act, LANDSLIDE Mar.-Apr. 2013, at 44, 44.104 id.
105 Id.
106 See generally Matt Levy, Patent Progress's Guide to Patent Reform
Legislation, PAT. PROGRESS (Mar. 4, 2014),
http://www.patentprogress.org/2014/03/04/patent-progresss-guide-to-patent-
reform-legislation; Sid Venkatesan, Examining the Effects of Patent-Troll
Legislation on Startups, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 3, 2013),
http://techcrunch.com/201 3/08/03/effects-of-patent-troll-legislation-on-startups/; /.
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representative of similar proposals being considered. 10 7 These proposed
measures fail to adequately solve the TPT problem and adequately balance
the many interests that must be considered when deciding on new
legislation. Many of the proposals, however, speak to some of the
individual underlying issues and propose novel ideas that should be
considered when crafting a final, comprehensive solution to this problem.
Several pieces of proposed legislation will be discussed herein. The
discussion of each proposal will include an overview of the proposed
language and its operation in practice, as well as its strengths and
weaknesses.
A. The SHIELD Act-Fee Shifting
The first piece of proposed legislation to examine is the Saving
High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013, or
"SHIELD" Act.108 Introduced by Congressman Peter DeFazio (D-OR) and
Congressman Jason Chaffetz (R-UT), 109 this proposed legislation is limited
to computer or software patents, a common technology area for TPTs."0
The SHIELD Act requires a plaintiff to post bond covering attorney's fees
before trial if the plaintiff is not an original inventor or assignee, did not
make a substantial investment in practicing the invention or is not a
university."' The proposed legislation then allows the court to award fees if
there was not a substantial likelihood of success in the case." 2 This process
is illustrated in Figure 1 below.
107 Efforts were made to ensure that this Note is up to date between authorship and
publication; however, as the discussion surrounding patent assertion entities is a
dynamic and hotly contested issue, some statements may be outdated as of the time
of this Note's publication.
"' H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
109 Id.; see Tim Wortsall, The Shield Act Tries to Kill the Patent Trolls. But Does It
Go Far Enough?, FORBES (Mar. 1, 2013, 12:16 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/03/01/the-shield-act-tries-to-kill-the-
patent-trolls-but-does-it-go-far-enough/.
Id.
"1I Christian J. Martinez, SHIELD Act Part 2 and Other Proposals to Combat
Trolls, IPWATCHDOG (Jun. 16, 2013, 7:40 AM),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/06/16/shield-act-part-2-and-other-proposals-to-
combat-trolls/id=41836/.
'
12 id.
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Figure 1: Flow Chart of the SHIELD Law Act
113
The SHIELD Act has its appeal. The SHIELD Act benefits
significantly from the use of a well-known tool: fee shifting. 1 4 Fee shifting
statutes have been used, quite influentially and successfully, in many areas
and particularly in public interest litigation such as civil rights. Challenging
a TPT by attempting to obtain an invalidity or non-infringement declaration
falls under public interest litigation because, as previously mentioned,
obtaining a declaratory judgment presents a free rider problem-one person
may bear the entire cost in time and resources to have a patent declared
invalid or to have a certain practice or technology declared as not infringing
a patent, yet the entire class of individuals actually or potentially affected
by the asserted patent(s) gets the benefit of no longer having to worry about
the TPT's threats. 5 Such action also inspires confidence in the USPTO as
well as the judicial system by rooting out bad patents and providing judicial
relief to deserving parties. Additionally, the incentive of attorney's fees
lowers the barrier to entry by providing an additional incentive for alleged
infringers to litigate the validity of the patent(s), as they may be able to
recoup their expenses.
113 id.
115 Id.
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Among the greatest weaknesses of the legislation is that it
essentially switches the traditional assumption of American legal
jurisprudence. American courts typically require each party to "pay their
own way."' 16 In public interest cases such as civil rights, the legislature has
reversed this presumption by permitting the court to award attorney's fees,
but only in "exceptional" cases. 1 7 The proposed SHIELD Act, however,
goes a step further and requires the court to award attorney's fees if the
defendant prevails, unless the case is exceptional." 8 This is a significant
departure from traditional American jurisprudence and thus likely faces an
uphill battle in becoming law. Rightly so, as this departure will capture a
good amount of legitimate patent assertion entities and discourage
individuals from asserting their legitimate intellectual property rights.
Beyond this potential hurdle, there are other weaknesses in the
SHIELD Act. First, the proposed legislation attempts to provide a carve out
for other patent assertion entities, but its scope is still too broad and will
likely capture a good number of other patent assertion entities. In essence,
the proposed legislation assumes that every party is a TPT, and then
provides certain exceptions, such as original inventors and universities,
rather than beginning with the traditional presumption that the parties are
not TPTs and then providing an exception for TPTs." 9 This presumption
creates an overly broad scope in which an unacceptable number of other
patent assertion entities would be forced to incur the burden of a bond
before trial and toil under the looming presumption of fee shifting. This
would certainly be a calculation considered by parties before attempting to
assert their patents in litigation and would prevent some parties from
entering litigation. It would also provide unfair settlement negotiation
leverage for the non-TPT entities caught in the fee-shifting presumption.
Secondly, the fee shifting provision does not solve the underlying problem
that the TPTs often exploit: the fact that the target entities typically do not
have the resources to bring a non-infringement or invalidity suit of greater
than $2,000,000. Third, this statute could dampen the market for the
purchase of patent portfolios by forcing buyers to take on the added liability
of such a costly lawsuit in potential attorney's fees to defend the validity of
their patents, particular considering that the SHIELD Act does not require
that the TPT sue the user first. A TPT user (individual or entity) of a
patented product could challenge a non-TPT patent holder's (individual or
entity) patent and with the presumption of awarding fees. This could force
legitimate patent assertion entity or simple patent owner to pay the suing
parties attorney's fees-potentially leading to a type of "reverse trolling."
116 John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured
Person's Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1567, 1578 (1993).17 Id.
118 H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (lst Sess. 2013).
ll9 See id.
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B. The Patent Abuse Reduction Act/Patent Litigation and Innovation
Act of 2013-Requiring Claim Charts and Placing Pleading Hurdles
for Patent Trolls
The Patent Abuse Reduction Act and the Patent Litigation and
Innovation Act of 2013 are two independent bills introduced by Senator
John Cornyn (R-TX) and Congressman Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY),
respectively.1 20 Both bills are essentially designed to discourage TPTs by
requiring the use of claim charts during pleadings.'21 A claim chart is a
well-known tool used in patent law that compares a claim in one patent
with a disclosure in another patent, other piece of prior art or an infringing
technology. Generally, the bills would require a plaintiff to document the
specific infringement action by the defendant by presenting it against each
claim of the asserted patent.122 More specifically, the bills require that a
plaintiff do the following: identify each patent; claim an accused
instrumentality, including if known, the name or model number; identify
where each element of each asserted claim identified is found within the
accused instrumentality; identify whether such element is infringed literally
or under the doctrine of equivalents; and identify how the terms in each
asserted claim correspond to the functionality of the accused
instrumentality. 123 The bills have other less significant requirements, such
as mandatory joinder of interested parties, and they provide for more
limited discovery (presumably to reduce costs and speed up the litigation)
and fee shifting.
124
This legislation seeks to impede TPTs by requiring that they
provide more tailored information for each pleading. This tailored
information makes it more likely that, in order to actually obtain a valid
infringement claim past a motion to dismiss or a summary judgment stage,
the infringement claims must be realized in the allegedly infringing
technology. While this can be an added burden on other patent assertion
entities, claim charts are well-known tools in patent litigation and they
would likely be crafted in one form or another during litigation, or even as a
part of basic pre-suit due diligence, anyhow, in order to prove a case of
infringement. These two bills seek to limit discovery and provide fee
shifting, both of which are designed to ease the burden for defendants to
fight TPTs.
120 S. 1013, 133th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); H.R. 2639, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
121 Id.; Levy, supra note 106; Stop Patent Trolls. Support the Innovation Act of
2013, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION,
https://action.eff.org/o/9042/p/dia/action3/common/public/?actionKEY=9416 (last
visited Mar. 31, 2014).
122 Levy, supra note 106.123 Id.
124 id
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These proposed bills fall short from truly fixing the TPT problem in
a few ways. TPTs often operate on the "scare tactic" principal by sending
threatening demand letters and scaring inexperienced and unsophisticated
parties into paying a licensing fee. Unfortunately, this practice would not be
necessarily impacted by these pieces of proposed legislation as the
requirements are set only for pleadings, not demand letters. It is true that
the ultimate litigation might be less burdensome, and thus more accessible
to these parties. However, these same parties are unlikely to have either the
resources or the inclination to become entangled in prolonged litigation
and, in any matter, most TPTs attempt to avoid litigation all together. The
TPTs cast a wide net of threatening letters and rely on a percentage of those
threatening letters to return a licensing fee. Those that actually do file suit
generally only do so in the hopes of settlement, rarely taking matter past the
initial pleading stage. Also, like the SHIELD Act, these bills do not solve
the free rider problem whereby one defendant is forced to shoulder the
burden and responsibilities of challenging the patent's validity while every
other defendant can free ride off of the defendant's declaratory judgment if
they are successful.
C. The End Anonymous Patents Act and Transparency Measures
Transparency measures are a class of proposed legislation that seek
to improve the visibility of asserting entities like TPTs. This is helpful
because transparency devices provide a means for potential defendants and
their counsel to ascertain whether they are dealing with a TPT or another
kind of patent assertion entity and formulate an appropriate strategy. Some
proposed legislation requires greater transparency in demand letters, while
others require greater transparency in the patents themselves.1 25 One
representative piece of proposed legislation is the End Anonymous Patents
Act, introduced by Ted Deutch (R-FL).126 This bill requires that issued
patents disclose the patent owner(s) and the real parties in interest.1 27 This
information is required to be updated throughout the life of the patent.1
28
This bill likely is the most realistic of any recently proposed
legislation because it is effective and not overly burdensome to any party.
The bill only solves part of the problem, however, and is therefore not a
complete solution. While the practice of disclosing the real party in interest
is already required by the USPTO, the USPTO lacks a strong enforcement
125 See generally Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform 2013: Demand Letter
Transparency Act of 2013, PATENTLY-O (Nov. 20, 2013),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/1 1/patent-reform-2013-demand-letter-
transparency-act-of-2013.html.
126 H.R. 2024, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).127 id.
128 m0
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mechanism, and this bill provides it.'29 The bill gives the USPTO
requirement real "teeth" by preventing the award of damages unless the
asserting party has established the accurate ownership and real party in
interest. 30 For example, the notorious patent assertion entity, Intellectual
Ventures, has an estimated 2,000 shell companies, which can make
ascertaining the true party in interest difficult, even for sophisticated
parties.1
3 1
Requiring the real party in interest is not an uncommon practice.
For example, titles to real property are part of the public record and their
transfer must be recorded. This not only allows a potential defendant to
evaluate the scope of an entity's ownership in a technology area for
determining whether pursuing a non-infringement or invalidity action is
worthwhile, but also serves to bring about a deeper information disclosure
during licensing or intellectual property acquisition transactions. 32 This
also allows parties to take proactive steps, such as acquiring patent
portfolios in a particular technology area, to help insulate them from
litigation. 133 This also discourages the practice of "privateering," at least as
used nefariously. Privateering refers to companies who hire other
companies to sue allegedly infringing parties in order to insulate themselves
from retaliation.134 Companies who hire other companies to enforce their
patents will still have to disclose that they are the real party in interest in
relation to the asserted patent. 135 This is helpful because some beneficial
non-practicing entities, such as universities, use these privateers to enforce
their patents. 36 Thus, this disclosure will only negatively impact those who
wish to keep their patent interest secret, such as TPTs.
129 Adi Kamdar, Whose Patent Is It Anyway? A New Bill to End Patent Anonymity,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (May 20, 2013),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/05/whose-patent-it-anyway-new-bill-end-
patent-anonymity.
id.
131 Id.
132 John Callaham, Microsoft Supports End Anonymous Patent Act in Congress,
NEOWIN (May 17, 2013 11:38 PM), http://www.neowin.net/news/microsoft-
supports-end-anonymous-patents-act-bill-in-us-congress.
133See id
134 Susan Decker, Patent Privateers Sail the Legal Waters Against Apple, Google,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 11, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-
01-1 1/patent-privateers-sail-the-legal-waters-against-apple-google.html.135 id.
136 See Mark Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 618 (2008).
One notable example is Eolas Technologies, Inc., v. Microsoft
Corp., in which the University of California licensed a software
patent to a company that really does look like a patent troll,
however you want to define that term, and then shared with that
company a jury award of $520.6 million against Microsoft.
Id. (citation omitted).
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Some critics believe that this bill does not go far enough and that
parties will get around the real party in interest requirement by simply
granting exclusive licensing agreements, which are not covered under the
proposed legislation, instead of granting outright ownership of a patent.
137
Some of these critics argue that the real party in interest requirement should
be disclosed even for licensing transactions. 138 Such a requirement,
however, would likely be overly burdensome and broad, capturing many
other legitimate patent assertion entities and hampering patent licensing
transactions. Particularly for the small businesses and entrepreneurs who
are arguably the most affected by TPTs, this measure likely falls short of
being truly effective because, while it may help them identify a troll, it does
not solve some of the fundamental problems with invalidity and non-
infringement litigation including the significant litigation costs and the free-
rider problem.
D. Vermont's New Legislation and State Law Tort Actions
This section is different from the rest for two reasons: first, because
it is involves a piece of legislation that has actually been enacted; second,
because it is the only state law action. This legislation is worth examination
because it is a unique and unprecedented solution to the TPT problem that
has seen actual use. Other states have taken other various state actions
based on existing law, such as consumer fraud or intimidation, but these
have largely failed to have any significant impact. 39 Vermont has taken up
the matter of TPTs within their state by passing legislation, called the Bad
Faith Assertions of Patent Infringements, that permits a state tort remedy
against TPTs.140 This law permits a state law tort cause of action against
parties that the court finds to have asserted their patents in bad faith.41 The
law does not give a bright-line rule as to what qualifies as a bad faith
assertion; however, some of the most common attributes of TPTs are listed
as part of a multi-factor, but neither comprehensive nor determinative, set
of considerations for a judge to assess. 14 These factors include asserting
137 Martinez, supra note 111.
138 See generally Kamdar, supra note 129.
139 See Bruning Enjoined in Patent Troll Case, LINCOLN J. STAR (Jan. 15, 2014,
11:00 AM), http://journalstar.com/business/local/bruning-enjoined-in-patent-troll-
case/article 7befd879-faa7-57a6-b59d-3e59be4d1888.html. Ohio and other states
have proposed similar legislation, but so far none have been successfully enacted.
See, e.g., Patent Troll Legislation Introduced in Ohio House, OHIO BANKER
DIRECT (Ohio Bankers League), Mar. 12, 2013.
140 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195-99 (2013); Eric Goldman, Vermont Enacts the
Nation's First Anti-Patent Trolling Law, FORBES (May 22, 2013, 2:22 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/05/22/vermont-enacts-the-nations-
first-anti-patent-trolling-law/; see also Ashby Jones, New York State Cracks Down
on 'Patent Trolls', WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2013, 7:05 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 100014240527023038197045793190710707
77820.141 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195-99.
142 See id.
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meritless claims, demanding an unreasonably short response to the demand
and failing to compare the claims to the party's specific technology. 143 This
law not only permits private parties to pursue an action, but also permits the
state attorney general to pursue such a claim.144 The statute allows for
significant compensation including equitable relief, costs (including
attorney's fees), treble damages and $50,000 in exemplary damages. 145
This law is helpful because it gives parties a means to recoup some
of the expenses of fighting a TPT. More importantly, it gives the state
attorney general the ability to fight TPTs on behalf of the people of the
state, thereby eliminating the free rider problem-at least at the state
level-by using public tax dollars to fight a TPT. In fact, Vermont's
attorney general has already utilized this new cause of action in pursuit of
such a remedy against one of the largest and notorious patent assertion
groups in recent history, MPHJ Technologies. 146 The complaint has been
filed and trial is pending. 1
47
While the enumerated factors used in the Vermont legislation are
helpful for identifying a TPT, when there is money to be made, plaintiffs
become notoriously crafty in managing to outpace legislation and will
likely find a way to design their business and draft pleadings to avoid this
state tort action. Additionally, because private parties suffer from a free
rider problem due to the high cost of litigation and public benefit of a
declaratory judgment of patent invalidity, this action is likely to be largely
limited to action by the state attorney general. Therefore, this is not
comprehensive because it fails to enable and incentivize individual private
parties to take action against TPTs. Whether this piece of state legislation is
effective or not may not matter. The subject matter of patents is exclusively
vested in the federal government by the U.S. Constitution, and it is
therefore unclear as of now if there will be a federal preemption issue raised
by this legislation.
148
While the proposed and enacted state and federal legislation
discussed herein contains many novel and useful ideas, it fails to
comprehensively and effectively fix the problems created by TPTs. There
are many useful ideas that have been proposed that have been borrowed,
modified and combined in this Note for Part V to present a comprehensive
and effective solution.
14' See id.
144 See id.
145 See id.
146 Goldman, supra note 140.
147 Id. See generally Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Invs. LLC, No. 282-5-13Wncv (Vt.
Sup. Ct. 2012).148 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Camilla A. Hrdy, What Is Happening in
Vermont: Patent Law Reform from the Bottom Up, PATENTLY-O (May 27, 2013),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/05/what-is-happening-in-vermont-patent-
law-reform-from-the-bottom-up.html.
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V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS BENEFITTING SMALL BUSINESSES AND
ENTREPRENEURS
The TPT is the only type of patent assertion entity that causes the
kind and degree of economic harm worthy of legislative and judicial
reform, as well as private action. TPTs take advantage of the high costs of
patent litigation and harm the public good by declaring a patent invalid for
personal gain. TPTs are particularly harmful to small businesses and
entrepreneurs, who are the frequent targets of their threats. There are many
types of patent assertion entities, but the TPTs are the only ones that
represent a true threat to, and net drain on, the economy. TPTs take
advantage of the high costs of contesting claims of infringement and
invalidity litigation coupled with the assertion of poor quality and likely
invalid patents in order to extract licensing fees on common technology.
TPTs take advantage of the lack of resources and experience of parties,
often small businesses and entrepreneurs, by trolling a large number of
potential defendants via threatening letters and demands for license fees and
rarely, if ever, actually litigate the infringement claims.
The implementation of the AIA has brought many changes to
patent law, some of which are likely to have a long-term adverse impact on
TPTs by increasing the quality of patents issued by the USPTO. In
particular, the addition of inter partes review provides a more thorough
process for post-grant challenges to patents as well as an administrative
forum where more complex factual issues may be considered that bear
weight on later adjudication. Additionally, legislation has been proposed,
and some has been enacted, at both the federal and state levels to combat
TPTs. Each of these proposals has its own strengths and weaknesses, but no
piece of legislation represents a comprehensive solution to the TPT
problem. This section seeks to present a comprehensive solution at the
federal level by modifying and combining some of the already proposed
ideas as well as introducing some unique ideas.
A. Encouraging Transparency by Enhancing the Real Party in
Interest Disclosure Requirement and a Callfor Private Sector Action
One flaw in the current system of patent laws that helps to create an
environment where TPTs thrive is the anonymity of real parties in interest.
Potential defendants encounter great difficulty in identifying whether they
are dealing with a TPT or another type of patent assertion entity, like the
heat seeking or inside trolls, because the real party in interest is often not
identified. The End Anonymous Patents Act and similar legislation seeks to
provide "teeth" to the mandatory disclosure of the real party in interest
requirement by requiring that the real party in interest be disclosed in order
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for a plaintiff to receive damages. 149 This measure also has the benefit of
providing a public shaming incentive to discourage TPTs, because TPTs
often come under public criticism once they are identified.1 50 The disclosure
of the real party in interest requirement is not overly burdensome because
the law already requires it. This legislation simply provides a stronger
enforcement mechanism. Heightened disclosure and transparency
requirements are a sound way to ensure that the requirement is actually
carried out.
While some critics state that this law does not go far enough and
that licensing should be included, that requirement would be overly
burdensome, as it would require every licensee or licensor to disclose every
license agreement with the USPTO. For example, for the popular word
processing program, Microsoft Word, Microsoft grants each user a limited
license on the use of its patented technology when the software is purchased
and installed. It is easy to see how such a requirement would be
burdensome as well as invasive. Some companies, like software companies,
would essentially be disclosing their entire client list to the USPTO,
presumably for public consumption. However, licensee and licensors are
still covered in limited circumstances. If a licensee or licensor wishes to sue
for infringement, they would still have to disclose themselves as the real
party in interest during litigation. This provides adequate protection to
parties being sued by licensees or licensors, while balancing the burden and
privacy of end users and legitimate patent assertion entities.
The End Anonymous Patents Act alone, however, is not sufficient
to provide the level of transparency needed to allow potential defendants to
identify whether or not a TPT is behind the threats. This is particularly true
because most TPTs base their business model on not pursuing litigation. As
such, one of the only ways that a potential defendant has to identify the
asserting party is the threatening letter, which often includes a sample
complaint. Any proposal for transparency should include a provision that
requires threatening letters and complaints to also identify the real party in
interest in order to collect damages. In this way, a potential defendant can
compare threatening letters to assist them in ascertaining whether they are
dealing with a TPT, and collectively, potential defendants across the
country can determine whether they may be dealing with the same TPT.
The USPTO could be required to provide a database of these letters
as submitted by users to allow potential defendants across the nation to help
identify if they are dealing with a TPT as well as other potential defendants
being targeted. It seems more realistic and efficient, however, that the
private sector could provide such a service. 51 The service could form a
149 H.R. 2024, 113th Cong. (lst Sess. 2013).
150 See, e.g., STOP PROJECT PAPERLESS, Ending Patent Trolling, http://stop-project-
paperless.com (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).1 Some such services have already begun to surface. See, e.g., TROLLING
EFFECTS, https://trollingeffects.org (last visited Apr. 6, 2014). These services have
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viable business model for private companies, a valuable draw for dues-
paying members of trade or intellectual property organizations, or law firms
who may use such a database as a means of advertising and generating
clients (subject to relevant ethical considerations). This way geographically
diverse or otherwise unknown and unaffiliated parties may compare
infringement demand letters to determine if they are likely dealing with a
TPT, devise a common strategy and ascertain whether they wish to act
cohesively in fighting the TPT.
B. Crowdsourced Funding and Establishing Other Similar
Mechanisms for Collaborative Action Against TPTs
As alluded to in the previous section, another essential component
of a comprehensive TPT solution is to foster and facilitate collective action
against TPTs. As previously noted, TPT victims are generally small
business owners and entrepreneurs who lack the resources to individually
fight a TPT and also suffer from a free rider problem if they invest
resources into challenging the infringement claim alone. This is particularly
true in the matter of challenging the patent's validity because there are
generally little or no damages to sue for if the patent is declared invalid.
Therefore, an individual challenger must risk significant resources with no
guarantee of a favorable outcome or way to recoup expenses. This
discourages many individual defendants from litigating against TPTs. If
these risks can be sufficiently dispersed over many individual defendants,
however, individuals will be more likely to fight TPTs. Risk dispersion is a
particularly effective solution because each individual defendant can benefit
equally from the patent being declared invalid. As such, a legislative or
judicial mechanism should be implemented that permits and incentivizes
individual small businesses and entrepreneurs to act collectively. Such
action would disperse their individual risk when faced with threats from the
same TPT over the same patents or technology. This can be accomplished
in many ways. In particular, a form of crowdsourced funding and private
collective action groups would provide an efficient solution. These
mechanisms are well known and require little additional regulatory burden.
An alternative possibility could be to recognize and permit class
actions against TPTs for invalidity. However, this solution does not work
well with the traditional model of class actions. Traditional class actions
require a financial incentive for attorneys to go out and find a large class
with potential damages distribution per plaintiff, so that the plaintiffs
attorney is incentivized to bring in as many plaintiffs as can be joined. In
been recognized and made available to inventors and practitioners by the USPTO
through their new webpage. See generally Been Sued or Gotten a Demand Letter?
Answers to Common Questions About Patent Litigation, USPTO,
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/litigation/index.jsp (last modified Feb. 20, 2014, 8:20
AM).
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the case of TPTs, there is no real financial gain incentive in play, rather it is
simply a problem of combining resources for defendants, hence the
suggestion of a crowdfunding solution and private collaborative groups.
Crowdsource funding has arisen lately as a popular means for collaborative
funding.'52 Crowdsource funding is "the practice of funding a project or
venture by raising many small amounts of money from a large number of
people, typically via the Internet."' 153 While primarily a concept and
mechanism for enhanced access to investment capital provided by recent
federal securities legislation, a similar mechanism might be organized by
private groups of individuals, law firms or trade organizations to finance
common defense actions involving TPTs.
By utilizing the proposed transparency mechanism discussed in
Part V, the many potential defendants threatened by a TPT may identify
each other and contribute to a central fund in order to fund a single
defendant's challenge to the patent's validity. If the challenge is successful,
all defendants share equally in the benefit of no longer having to pay a
licensing fee to the TPT. This method can still suffer from a free rider
problem, however, as the other threatened parties who did not contribute to
the fund benefit from the patent being declared invalid. In order to counter
this weakness, some incentive must be potentially available to the
participating parties.
This measure does not stop with crowdsource funding of litigation,
however. Other sources of private collaborative action could be used,
proactively and reactively, to fend off TPTs. Some organizations have
already begun to emerge in technology groups that bring together patent
lawyers to devise proactive and defensive strategies. 54 Private collaborative
action groups, like the aforementioned organizations, could be formed for
the proactive or reactive strategies of acquiring potentially contestable
patents, generating "rainy day" funds for future litigation, or acting as the
hosting entity for collaborative action by defendants-gathering threatened
parties, devising a common strategy, selecting a representative party,
collecting expenses and managing litigation. 155 Trade associations would
likely be ideal vehicles for these collaborative action groups as they are
built around a common technology or business and typically already have
common interests, dues-paying members, experience in managing litigation
and in-house counsel or relationships with law firms.
152 Tanya Prive, What Is Crowdfunding and How Does It Benefit the Economy,
FORBES (Nov. 27, 2012, 10:50 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2012/11/27/what-is-crowdfunding-and-
how-does-it-benefit-the-economy/.153 id,
154 Ronnie Cohen, Make Alliances to Fend Off 'Trolls' - Lawyers, REUTERS LEGAL,
Dec. 12, 2013.
"' See id.
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C. Fee Shifting and Exemplary Damages-Providing Incentives for
Private, Collaborative Action Against TPTs
In order to diminish or avoid the free rider problem, incentives
must be established for potential defendants to get off the bleachers and into
the ring by joining in on collaborative actions. A proposal for combating
TPTs, therefore, should include a provision for fee shifting reasonable
attorney's fees and expenses. Fee shifting is a well-known mechanism that
is increasing in popularity. 156 Again, the resources and risks involved with
patent litigation are high and this represents a significant barrier to entry,
particularly for small business and entrepreneurs. Traditionally, fee shifting
has been reserved in the United States to those cases that foster good public
policy, and fighting TPTs does exactly that. As mentioned throughout this
Note, TPTs represent a free rider problem, and thus if one defendant (or a
group of defendants acting collaboratively, as discussed in this solution) is
successful in having the courts declare appropriate patents invalid, they are
not only providing a public benefit for current or future threatened parties,
but they are also helping to ensure that good-quality patents are issued by
the USPTO by providing increased judicial scrutiny of issued patents. As
such, granting reasonable attorney's fees and expenses is warranted. These
attorney's fees would provide an important compensation incentive for
more parties to enter a cohesive agreement to fight the TPT jointly as they
have the potential to be reimbursed for their expenses along with
distributing their risks.
This incentive, while likely not perfect in attracting all potential
defendants, strikes a fair balance between encouraging potential defendants
to join an action and being overly-burdensome to other patent assertion
entities. 57 This measure also has the advantage of private-ordering
flexibility that allows for any type of contribution method to the shared
defense, including standardized contributions, contributions based on the
size of the entity, anonymous and published contributions. Crowdfunding
would also allow large companies and manufacturers who might have an
interest in the matter, but do not want to become embroiled in the litigation
publicly for fear of retaliation or liability, to contribute anonymously in any
amount they desire. In contrast, for those who wish to publicly make a
stand or believe that supporting collaborative actions grounds would be
good publicity, crowdfunding provides a mechanism for them to help out in
varying amounts and without the fear of their own liability.
156 See generally Patrick H.J. Hughes, IP Associations Urge High Court to Lower
Fees Award Standard (U.S.), REUTERS, Dec. 19, 2013, available at
2013 WL 76640204.
157 Further, to the extent that states or the federal government wish to recognize the
public benefits that can be realized by successfully challenging TPTs via non-
infringement and/or invalidity proceedings, they may choose to provide grants
and/or tax incentives to encourage these actions.
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The aforementioned fee-shifting statutes such as the SHIELD Act,
however, fall short in some respects. A fee-shifting statute should follow
the traditional method of awarding reasonable attorney's fees only in
exceptional cases. In the unique patent context, it makes sense to borrow
from the bad faith test in the Vermont statute. 5 8 Fee shifting should be
based on bad faith factors such as those listed in the Vermont statute, but
not limited to those factors to allow judicial rulemaking, common sense and
intrinsic fairness to keep pace with the nefarious ingenuity of TPTs.
Attorney's fees alone, however, may not prove enough to
incentivize collective action based on the uncertainty of collection.
Therefore, the use of exemplary damages in exceptional cases would
provide possible compensation for these risks in order to properly
incentivize potential defendants to challenge TPTs. The use of exemplary
damages is an extreme measure, however, and should only be considered if
the implementation of attorney's fees and expenses proves to be too weak
to adequately incentivize collective or individual action against the TPTs.
Should exemplary damages be utilized, they should follow the same multi-
factored test described under the Vermont statute and be limited by statute
to the amount found to properly incentivize parties to join collaboratively to
sufficiently thwart TPTs. This may be determined academically or by real
world experimentation.
In an example previously mentioned, a TPT was suing small
companies for the use of networked printer-scanner-copiers. 5 9 The TPT
specifically stated in its threatening letters that it did not wish to pursue the
manufacturers. 160 The TPT likely stated this because it knew that these
manufacturers had the resources to contest the claim, so no known
manufacturers became involved.16 1 Under a crowdfunding mechanism,
manufacturers who have an interest in proving that they do not produce
infringing technology, but who might not want to contribute directly for
fear of liability or lack of funding, could contribute indirectly and in
whatever amount via crowdfunding. This could also be an advantageous
public relations move for a company. If, on the other hand, the manufacture
or parent company did not want to become involved publically for fear of
retaliatory action, they could contribute anonymously via crowdfunding.
As another example, banks, particularly small community banks,
have become a frequent target for TPTs based on ATM or software
technologies. 162 These banks could choose to band together via a trade
organization such as the state bankers league to fight TPTs. Further, as
patents are national in scope, state-level trade organizations could
coordinate with national trade associations to provide even further risk
158 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195-99 (2013).
159 Salzberg, supra note 57.
160 See Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Invs. LLC, No. 282-5-13Wncv (Vt. Sup. Ct. 2012).
161 See Salzberg, supra note 57.
162 See Finkle, supra note 60.
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distribution and a larger base for resource gathering. This would likely
make the cost for an individual defendant to join a collective non-
infringement or invalidity defense action much smaller, perhaps even lower
than the cost of the licensing fee. This lowered cost combined with the
possibility of recouping individual costs of litigation, or even exemplary
damages, would likely make an individual defendant much more likely to
join a collective action.
It is true that a certain segment of potential defendants will remain
unlikely to challenge a TPT, despite available incentives, and opt for just
paying a licensing fee. The proposed measures strike an appropriate balance
of incentivizing and capturing a significant partition of these potential
defendants while not becoming overly burdensome on other patent
assertion entities. In the long term, the presented solution coupled with
natural market actions will incentivize the majority of potential defendants
of TPTs to challenge the validity of the asserted patents and thus reduce the
practice of TPTs. This will have the added benefit of restoring confidence
in the USPTO, the judicial system in general and lead to better quality
patents.
V. CONCLUSION
A key aspect to solving any problem is first identifying the problem
itself. The term patent troll is often overused and includes patent assertion
entities that protect legitimate business interests and do not generate the
same economic concerns as TPTs. While it is difficult to draw bright-line
distinctions between TPTs and other patent assertion entities, this Note
presents a flexible, multi-factored test based on judicial principals and
economic factors that tend to indicate a TPT. Vague, ambiguous and likely
invalid patents are typically the basis of a TPTs' business. The AIA has
taken steps in reducing TPTs' practice by providing helpful mechanisms,
like inter partes review, for improving the quality of patents. As TPTs have
been the target of much high-profile scrutiny recently, and a great deal of
legislation has been proposed to combat their practices. While there are
many useful ideas in the proposed legislation, many of the proposals
overextend and would capture too many legitimate patent assertion entities,
some others under reach, and fail to capture enough TPTs to have a
significant impact. Generally, each piece of legislation only addresses a
narrow part of the TPT problem. A piece of comprehensive legislation is
lacking.
This Note proposes a balanced and comprehensive solution that
calls on well-known legislative and judicial reform mechanisms of
transparency, crowdsourced funding, fee shifting and possibly exemplary
damages. This solution will beneficially alter the public and private sector
incentives to act against and challenge TPTs. Private sector entities, in
particular, will be incentivized and enabled to act individually and
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collaboratively to challenge TPTs. The implementation of this solution
would lead to the long-term significant reduction in TPTs as well as vague
and ambiguous patents, both of which have significant private and public
costs. This solution substantially reduces or even eliminates the harmful
TPTs while preserving the social goals of the patent system by protecting
legitimate patent assertion entities.

